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CITIZENS UNITED, STEVENS, AND
HUMANITARIAN LAW PROJECT: FIRST
AMENDMENT RULES AND STANDARDS IN
THREE ACTS
William D. Araiza*
The confluence of Justice Stevens' retirement from the United
States Supreme Court and the five-year anniversary of Chief Jus-
tice Roberts' ascension provides an opportunity for a new look at
the familiar debate over the relative desirability of rigid rules and
contextualized, fact-specific analysis in constitutional cases.' In a
trio of recent First Amendment cases, the Court has stated and
applied, and then retreated from, strict doctrinal rules and the
refusal to defer to congressional findings that normally accom-
pany such rules.2 These cases raise anew the question of the
appropriateness of such rules and their durability as meaningful
constraints on courts confronting difficult fact patterns. To con-
vert into a question Justice Souter's defense of such rules: does
deciding First Amendment cases based on "fairly strict categorical
rules" really "keep[] the starch in the standards for those
moments when the daily politics cries loudest for limiting what
may be said"?'
This short Article considers three First Amendment cases
decided during the 2009-2010 term: United States v. Stevens,
* @ 2011, William D. Araiza. All rights reserved. Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law
School. B.A., Columbia University, 1983; M.S., Georgetown University, 1985; J.D., Yale
University, 1990. Thanks to Joseph Blocher, David Pozen, and the participants in the
Constitutional Law Discussion Forum at the University of Louisville Louis D. Brandeis
School of Law for helpful comments on earlier versions of this Article.
1. For a general introduction to the rules-standards debate, see H.L.A. Hart, The
Concept of Law 121-150 (Oxford U. Press 1961).
2. Holder v. Humanitarian L. Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705 (2010); United States v. Ste-
vens, 130 S. Ct. 1577 (2010); Citizens United v. Fed. Election Commn., 130 S. Ct. 876
(2010).
3. Denver Area Educ. Telecomm. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 774 (1996)
(Souter, J., concurring).
4. 130 S. Ct. 1577.
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Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission,' and Holder v.
Humanitarian Law Project.' Each of these cases speaks to the
issue of strict (or even categorical)7 versus contextual approaches
to the First Amendment.' Stevens reflects First Amendment rigid-
ity in its refusal to engage in ad hoc balancing to determine
whether categories of speech fall completely outside constitutional
protection.' Citizens United reflects a related (if distinct) rigidity,
both in its stringent application of the rules against content and
identity-based speech restrictions and in its refusal to defer to
congressional judgments relevant to the First Amendment issue."o
Humanitarian Law Project rejects both types of rigidity on
display in Citizens United." In his opinion for the majority, Chief
Justice Roberts stated that the Court was applying a "demand-
ing" First Amendment standard, 12 but the Court nonetheless
subjected the statute at issue to fairly mild review." As part of
that mild review, it largely deferred to congressional judgments
5. 130 S. Ct. 876.
6. 130 S. Ct. 2705.
7. This Article distinguishes between "strict" or "rigid" approaches, such as the strict
scrutiny rule for content-based speech restrictions, and "categorical" approaches, such as a
rule that absolutely prohibits government from imposing certain speech restrictions. On
the modern Court, the most prominent proponent of such categorical rules is Justice Ken-
nedy. See Araiza, infra n. 16, at _ (ms. at 36-38) (discussing Justice Kennedy's
categorical approach to First Amendment issues). Thus, this Article considers three types
of approaches to the First Amendment: contextual, flexible standards (such as those
championed by Justice Stevens); rigid standards (such as the strict scrutiny standard for
content-based speech restrictions); and categorical standards, or rules (such as Justice
Kennedy's argument for a per se prohibition on content-based speech restrictions). As the
context requires, this Article may describe either of these latter doctrines as "rules" or
"standards." Given the salience of the rule-standard distinction in legal theory, the reader
is cautioned not to import those broader implications automatically into this Article's use
of one term or the other.
8. For an excellent summary of the distinction between rules and standards and the
benefits and drawbacks of each, see Joseph Blocher, Roberts' Rules: The Assertiveness of
Rules-Based Jurisprudence, 46 Tulsa L. Rev. _ (forthcoming 2011) (copy on file with
Author).
9. See 130 S. Ct. at 1585 (stating that "[tihe First Amendment's guarantee of free
speech does not extend only to categories of speech that survive ad hoc balancing of rela-
tive social costs and benefits").
10. See 130 S. Ct. at 911, 913, 945-947 (holding fast to the rules against content and
identity-based restrictions and refusing to defer to Congress' judgments pertaining to the
First Amendment issue).
11. See 130 S. Ct. at 2724-2731 (providing the reasons why the Court rejects both
types of rigidity).
12. Id. at 2724.
13. See id. at 2724-2731 (discussing the government's interest protected by the stat-
ute).
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about the dangers presented by the speech the statute restricts.1 4
While there may be good reasons for such deference, given the
national security context of the case, the Court's approach never-
theless creates at least some tension with the stiffness of the
Court's standards in Stevens and Citizens United.
The Stevens retirement"5 and the five-year anniversary of the
Roberts Court frame this issue neatly.'" Chief Justice Roberts
authored two of the majority opinions in these cases. His now
(in)famous comparison of judging to baseball umpiring, with all of
its promises of neutrality and objectivity, has direct relevance to
the question of whether rigid doctrinal tests can satisfactorily
answer the difficult free-speech questions that reach the Court."
In contrast to a rigid approach stands the more contextual
approach often associated with Justice Stevens. Justice Stevens
was well known for eschewing a rigid, rule-based analysis of First
Amendment issues in favor of one based on principles and factual
context.1 8 Instead of relying on rules, such as the strict scrutiny
requirement for content-based restrictions, Justice Stevens
instead preferred to decide First Amendment cases by recourse to
broad principles, such as a general disfavoring of speech restric-
14. Id.
15. See generally Sheryl Gay Stolberg & Charlie Savage, Stevens's Retirement Is Polit-
ical Test for Obama, N.Y. Times Al (Apr. 9, 2010) (discussing Justice Stevens' retirement).
16. In other writing, I have discussed at greater length how Justice Stevens' jurispru-
dence compares with that of Chief Justice Roberts with regard to rules versus standards.
See William D. Araiza, Justice Stevens and Constitutional Adjudication: The Law beyond
the Rules, 44 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. _ (forthcoming 2011) (ms. at 35-47, available at http:l
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract -id=1758021).
17. The third opinion considered, Citizens United, was authored by Justice Kennedy,
who at times has taken the most categorical First Amendment approach of all the current
Justices. See e.g. Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the N.Y. St. Crime Victims Bd., 502
U.S. 105, 124 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (calling for a categorical prohibition on
content-based speech restrictions except for those restricting unprotected speech). His call
for such a categorical jurisprudence-similar to Justice Black's insistence that, in the
context of the First Amendment, no law means no law-also raises the question of the
workability of such an approach to First Amendment cases. See Beauharnais v. Ill., 343
U.S. 250, 275 (1952) (Black, J., dissenting) (stating that "I think the First Amendment. . .
'absolutely' forbids such laws without any 'ifs' or 'buts' or 'whereases'").
18. See e.g. John Paul Stevens, The Freedom of Speech, 102 Yale L.J. 1293, 1304-1305
(1993) ("There are ... decisions . . . that depart from the prohibition on content-based
regulation without undermining its central goals. They do so by supplementing, if not
replacing, the black-letter rule with a sensitivity to fact and context that allows for
advancement of the principles underlying the protection of free speech."); see also
Araiza, supra n. 16, at _ (ms. at 5-47) (discussing Justice Stevens' First Amendment
jurisprudence).
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tions motivated by paternalistic governmental concern that citi-
zens will use information poorly.19
Justice Stevens' positions in at least two of these three cases
are telling. In Citizens United, he wrote the dissent for the four
liberals, which is a full-throated attack on rigid, categorical analy-
sis in First Amendment law. 0 But in Humanitarian Law Project,
which, as explained below, represents a less rigid approach to the
First Amendment, Justice Stevens broke with the liberal bloc and
joined Chief Justice Roberts' majority opinion.2 1 Thus, his posi-
tions in these cases 22 present a window through which one can
consider both the Roberts Court's commitment to rigid First
Amendment standards and the merits of such a commitment.
L CITIZENS UNITED, STEVENS, AND HUMANITARIAN
LAW PROJECT
A. Citizens United: "Glittering Generality"23
In Citizens United, the Court overruled two of its campaign-
finance precedents and protected corporate and union speech that
explicitly endorsed or attacked political candidates.2 4 Writing for
the five-Justice majority, Justice Kennedy used broad language in
reaching the Court's result. He acknowledged his own view that
the First Amendment categorically prohibits restrictions on polit-
ical speech before adopting, for purposes of deciding the case, the
more mainstream view that such restrictions are subject to strict
scrutiny.25 He also concluded that the First Amendment
19. See e.g. 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. R.I., 517 U.S. 484, 497 (1996) (observing that the
First Amendment frowns on speech restrictions motivated by paternalistic government
concerns that people cannot be trusted with information).
20. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 929-979 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissent-
ing in part).
21. 130 S. Ct. at 2712.
22. Justice Stevens joined Chief Justice Roberts' majority opinion in Stevens. 130 S.
Ct. at 1582.
23. Citizens United, 130 S.Ct. at 930 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part). This term comes from Justice Stevens' critique of the majority's broad statement
that the First Amendment prohibits identity-based restrictions on speech. Id. (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
24. 130 S. Ct. 876.
25. Justice Kennedy stated:
While it might be maintained that political speech simply cannot be banned or
restricted as a categorical matter, . .. [Federal Election Commission v. Wisconsin
824 [Vol. 40
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"[p]rohibit[s] ... restrictions distinguishing among different
speakers,"2 6 conceding only that such restrictions have been
upheld in pursuit of the government "interest in allowing
governmental entities to perform their functions."27
Justice Kennedy was as good as his word in applying these
principles. He weaved his way through pre-Buckley v. Valeo28
precedent that appeared to allow such identity-based restric-
tions,2 9 explained away Buckley's failure to strike down an
identity-based speech restriction in the law it otherwise exhaus-
tively reviewed,3 0 minimized or ignored cases between First
National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti"' and Austin v. Michigan
Chamber of Commerce3 2 that upheld identity-based restrictions on
political speech,3 3 severely criticized the rationales in Austin that
implied the appropriateness of identity-based restrictions,34 and
rejected the argument that an interest in fighting government
corruption or (in the case of corporate restrictions) protecting dis-
senting shareholders could justify limits on corporate or union
speech."5
In addition to applying its strict doctrinal rule against identi-
ty-based speech restrictions, Justice Kennedy's majority opinion
also gave short shrift to any claim that the Court should defer to
Congress' conclusions about the political-integrity implications of
unlimited corporate and union spending. In language that echoes
Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449 (2007), which requires strict scrutiny of restrictions
on political speech,] provides a sufficient framework for protecting the relevant First
Amendment interests in this case. We shall employ it here.
Id. at 898.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 899 (citing cases dealing with speech by students, prisoners, military per-
sonnel, and federal employees).
28. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
29. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 899-901.
30. See id. at 902 (stating that "Buckley did not consider [Section] 610's separate ban
on corporate and union independent expenditures.... Had [Section] 610 been challenged
in the wake of Buckley, however, it could not have been squared with the reasoning and
analysis of that precedent.").
31. 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
32. 494 U.S. 652 (1990).
33. See Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 903 (transitioning directly from Bellotti to Austin
without considering cases such as Federal Election Commission v. Massachusetts Citizens
for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238 (1986), and Federal Election Commission v. National Right to
Work Committee, 459 U.S. 197 (1982), both of which upheld identity-based restrictions).
34. Id. at 904-908.
35. Id. at 908-911.
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some of the Court's more aggressive opinions reining in congres-
sional power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment, he wrote:
When Congress finds that a problem exists, we must give
that finding due deference; but Congress may not choose an
unconstitutional remedy.... We must give weight to
attempts by Congress to seek to dispel either the appearance
or the reality of [corrupting] influences. The remedies
enacted by law, however, must comply with the First
Amendment; and, it is our law and our tradition that more
speech, not less, is the governing rule.36
Justice Kennedy did not directly consider the argument that
Congress could not be trusted to write speech-restrictive cam-
paign-finance legislation because of its members' self-interest in
protecting the advantages of incumbency. At oral argument in the
case, however, Justice Scalia pressed the government on this
point. Moreover, as Justice Stevens noted in his dissent, Justice
Scalia's dissenting opinion several years earlier in McConnell v.
Federal Election Commission" expressed the view that, in gen-
eral, restrictions on political speech tend to favor incumbents.39
Thus, in Citizens United Justice Kennedy applied a rigid, speech-
protective principle and failed to consider seriously the possibility
that Congress should receive deference for its conclusions about
the corrupting effect of corporate and union speech expendi-
tures.40
Justice Stevens wrote a lengthy dissent that engaged Justice
Kennedy on both of these points. He argued that the majority
36. Id. at 911.
37. Transcr., Citizens United v. Fed. Election Commn., http://www.supremecourt
.gov/oral arguments/argument transcripts/08-205[Reargued].pdf at 50:22-25 to 51:1-3
(Sept. 9, 2009) (130 S. Ct. 876 (2010)).
38. 540 U.S. 93 (2003).
39. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 969 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) (citing McConnell, 540 U.S. at 249 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part)).
40. Indeed, Justice Kennedy questioned whether, as a theoretical matter, the type of
favoritism or access such speech expenditures ensured could be considered corrupting at
all. See Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 910 ('"Favoritism and influence are not ... avoidable
in representative politics. It is in the nature of an elected representative to favor certain
policies, and, by necessary corollary, to favor the voters and contributors who support
those policies. ... Democracy is premised on responsiveness.'") (quoting McConnell v. Fed.
Election Commn., 540 U.S. 93, 297 (2003) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part)).
826 [Vol. 40
2011] First Amendment Rules and Standards in Three Acts
"dramatically overstate[d] its critique of identity-based distinc-
tions."4 1 He noted the contexts in which Justice Kennedy conceded
the existence of precedent upholding identity-based distinctions,
but he questioned whether those cases could be cabined as easily
as Justice Kennedy suggested.4 2 He also noted additional cases in
which the Court had upheld identity-based restrictions on politi-
cal speech.43 This discussion provided the foundation for Justice
Stevens' argument that it was appropriate for Congress to single
out corporate and union speech, given the unique problems such
speech presented.
Justice Stevens also provided a more nuanced discussion of
the argument for deference to congressional findings about the
corrupting effect of corporate and union speech. He criticized as
"airy speculation" the Court's statements (and past statements by
members of the Citizens United majority) that restrictions on
such speech had the effect of favoring incumbents, noting the lack
of record evidence that such restrictions had either that effect or
that purpose.44 This is not to say Justice Stevens embraced
unquestioning deference in this context. He recognized that defer-
ence would not be appropriate "if there were a solid basis for
believing that legislative action was motivated by the desire to
protect incumbents or that it will degrade the competitiveness of
the electoral process."4 But he condemned the Court's attitude
toward Congress' factfindings as a "cavalier[ ] [disregard]," con-
trasting the majority's approach with "conscientious policing for
impermissibly anticompetitive motive or effect in a sensitive First
Amendment context."46 Thus, both on the larger doctrinal point
and on the deference point, Justice Stevens took issue with the
majority's rigidity, calling for less categorical and more fact- or
context-specific analysis.
41. Id. at 948 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
42. Id. at 946 n. 46.
43. Id. at 946-947 (citing Ark. Educ. TV Commn. v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666 (1998); Bur-
son v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191 (1992)).
44. Id. at 968-970.
45. Id. at 969.
46. Id. at 970.
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B. Stevens: The Rejection of Ad Hoc Balancing
In Stevens, the Court struck down, on First Amendment
grounds, a federal law forbidding the sale of depictions of animal
cruelty.4 7 For the purpose of this Article, the most relevant part of
the case is the Court's explanation of Chaplinsky v. New Hamp-
shire's48 traditional categories of speech that fall outside the
protection of the First Amendment.4 9 In arguing for an expansion
of that list to include animal cruelty depictions, the government
relied heavily on prior judicial analysis of unprotected speech.so
Seizing on Chaplinsky's famous statement that the categories it
identified encompass speech that is "of such slight social value as
a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is
clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality,"'
the government argued that depictions of animal cruelty could
also be so described, and thus merited exclusion from the First
Amendment's protections.52 Writing for the Court, Chief Justice
Roberts would have none of it:
As a free-floating test for First Amendment coverage, [the
government's argument] is startling and dangerous. The
First Amendment's guarantee of free speech does not extend
only to categories of speech that survive an ad hoc balancing
of relative social costs and benefits. The First Amendment
itself reflects a judgment by the American people that the
benefits of its restrictions on the Government outweigh the
costs. Our Constitution forecloses any attempt to revise that
judgment simply on the basis that some speech is not worth
it....
To be fair to the Government, its view did not emerge
from a vacuum. As the Government correctly notes, this
Court has often described historically unprotected categories
of speech as being 'of such slight social value as a step to
truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is
clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and moral-
47. 130 S. Ct. at 1592.
48. 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
49. See Stevens, 130 S. Ct. at 1584 (citing Chaplinsky and listing cases upholding
restrictions on the content of specific types of speech).
50. Id. at 1585.
51. 315 U.S. at 572.
52. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. at 1585.
828 [Vol. 40
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ity."' R.A.V. [v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 383 (1992)]
(quoting Chaplinsky). In New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747
(1982), we noted that within these categories of unprotected
speech, "the evil to be restricted so overwhelmingly out-
weighs the expressive interests, if any, at stake, that no
process of case-by-case adjudication is required," because
"the balance of competing interests is clearly struck." The
Government derives its proposed test from these descrip-
tions in our precedents.
But such descriptions are just that-descriptive. They do
not set forth a test that may be applied as a general matter
to permit the Government to imprison any speaker so long
as his [or her] speech is deemed valueless or unnecessary, or
so long as an ad hoc calculus of costs and benefits tilts in a
statute's favor.53
The Court then went on to explain that its decision in New
York v. Ferber5 4 to accord unprotected status to child pornography
reflected a "special case" in which "[t]he market for child pornog-
raphy was 'intrinsically related' to the underlying [child] abuse,
and was therefore 'an integral part of the production of such
materials, an activity illegal throughout the Nation."'" Chief Jus-
tice Roberts thus described Ferber as having "grounded its
analysis in a previously recognized, long-established category of
unprotected speech": speech that was an integral part of unlawful
conduct."
Thus, in Stevens Chief Justice Roberts explicitly and force-
fully rejected ad hoc balancing of the value of a given type of
speech against its social costs. This rejection does not necessarily
reflect a completely rigid doctrinal framework; Chief Justice
Roberts recognized that new categories may be added in the
future. But he insisted that such "new" categories would have
always existed, rather than being created as a result of contempo-
rary balancing." Because this historical method-like originalism
in general-implies not a creation of new categories but a discov-
ery of categories that have always existed, it is presumably
53. Id. at 1585-1586 (emphasis in original) (some citations omitted).
54. 458 U.S. 747 (1982).
55. Stevens 130 S. Ct. at 1586 (quoting Ferber, 458 U.S. at 759, 761).
56. Id.
57. Id.
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impervious to context-based analysis or the perceived needs of the
moment, at least to the extent a court employs it conscientiously
and at the high level of generality implied by the issue in Ste-
vens-the protected status of broad categories of speech."
C. Humanitarian Law Project: The Grutter of the Roberts Court?
After Citizens United and Stevens, the Court's analysis in
Humanitarian Law Project may come as something of a surprise.
In Humanitarian Law Project, the Court upheld a statute prohib-
iting speech made in conjunction with a terrorist group and
amounting to "material support" for the group, even when the
speech consisted of training the group how to use peaceful
methods of conflict resolution." It is easy to understand the
Court's concern about terrorism and speech that may assist ter-
rorist groups, regardless of whether one agrees with the result in
the case. But the Court's analytic path in reaching the result sug-
gests a retreat from the starchy standards on display in Citizens
United and Stevens.
In Humanitarian Law Project, the Court conceded that, at
least as applied to the plaintiffs, the statute constituted a content-
58. The sudden "discovery" of a new category of speech that historically has been
unprotected seems unlikely. Perhaps we will see new applications of the First Amend-
ment's exception for speech integrally related to criminal conduct as conduct (such as child
abuse) is newly criminalized. But entirely new categories seem unlikely, unless a new
trove of historical information suddenly reveals the historically unprotected status of cer-
tain categories of speech that individuals in the modern world have not attempted to
engage in or that governments have not attempted to suppress, and the constitutional
status of which thus have not been litigated.
On this point, more hints may come from the Court's pending decision in Schwarze-
negger v. Entertainment Merchants Association, No. 08-1448 (U.S. docketed May 21, 2009),
which considers the constitutionality of restrictions on the sale of violent video games to
minors. Indeed, at oral argument in Entertainment Merchants, Justice Sotomayor referred
to Stevens and asked the attorney for the state how its restriction on violent video game
sales responded to a historical consensus that such speech was unprotected. Transcr.,
Schwarzenegger v. Ent. Merchants Assn., http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral-arguments/
argument -transcripts/08-1448.pdf at 8:12 to 8:21 (Nov. 2, 2010). Justice Scalia asked
essentially the same question. Id. at 15:23 to 15:25, 16:1 to 16:22, 17:8 to 17:13. While
these two exchanges involved the attorney for the state, Chief Justice Roberts engaged in a
colloquy with the game developers' lawyer suggesting that children had in fact tradition-
ally been protected from speech of the sort the statute sought to restrict. Id. at 33:2 to
33:12, 33:21 to 33:25; 34:5 to 34:8, 34:10, 34:14 to 34:19. On the other hand, Justice Alito
pressed the gaming industry's lawyer on whether the newness of the video game medium
rendered Stevens' historical analysis at least partially irrelevant. Id. at 37:16 to 37:25, 38:2
to 38:10.
59. 130 S. Ct. at 2725, 2730.
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based restriction on speech."0 It was not a complete ban; the
plaintiffs could advocate as they wished as long as they did not do
so in concert with the organizations themselves." Nevertheless,
the statute clearly implicated the First Amendment.6 2 Indeed, its
impact on the First Amendment was not a collateral effect of a
ban on some other conduct; as the Court observed, the conduct at
issue in Humanitarian Law Project "consist[ed] of communicating
a message."63 For these reasons, the Court rejected application of
the intermediate scrutiny it applied in United States v. O'Brien6 4
to restrictions on conduct that had the collateral effect of restrict-
ing expression." Instead, it concluded that "a more demanding
standard" was called for."
This preliminary statement of the applicable law already
suggests some softening in the Court's First Amendment juris-
prudence-in contrast to Justice Breyer's dissent, the Court did
not speak the words "strict scrutiny."67 But more slippage was in
the offing. In reviewing the speech restriction, Chief Justice
Roberts' majority opinion largely deferred to judgments made by
Congress and the Executive Branch." The Court deferred to Con-
gress' determination that any aid to the target organizations was
fungible, in that it translated into assistance that could be used to
further their violent acts, even if the Court also stated that it was
independently convinced of this argument." Much of its argument
60. Id. at 2723.
61. Id. at 2730.
62. Indeed, after Citizens United it would have been difficult for the Humanitarian
Law Project Court to rely on the plaintiffs' ability to speak on their own to conclude that
the statute did not implicate the First Amendment. After all, under the Bipartisan Cam-
paign Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81 (2002), corporations were always
allowed to speak via a political-action committee and could have spoken on their own out-
side of the immediate pre-election period. Yet the Citizens United Court still analyzed the
statute as a content-based prohibition on speech. 130 S. Ct. at 899, 928.
63. 130 S. Ct. at 2724.
64. 391 U.S. 367 (1968) (upholding a statute prohibiting the burning of selective-
service certificates after finding the government had a substantial interest in prohibiting
such conduct and that the statute was narrowly tailored to serve the government's non-
expression-suppressing interest).
65. Humanitarian L. Project, 130 S. Ct. at 2723-2724.
66. Id. at 2724 (quoting Tex. v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 403 (1989)).
67. Id. at 2734 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
68. Id. at 2725 (majority).
69. Id.
831
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on this point simply referred to an affidavit filed by a State
Department official.70
Beyond deferring to the other branches on this "empirical""
question, the Court did not apply any real narrow-tailoring analy-
sis or otherwise discuss whether the statute, as construed, swept
too broadly.7 2 Indeed, the Court's only discussion of tailoring con-
cerned the tailoring Congress engaged in through the limitations
it built into the statute.3 Of course, such legislative care may
help convince a court that a statute truly is narrowly tailored. But
normally a narrow-tailoring discussion does not simply cite the
statute's internal boundaries without an independent judicial
determination that those limitations suffice to render the statute
sufficiently narrowly tailored. As with the empirical question of
the fungible nature of assistance to such groups, here too the
Court deferred.7 4
So understood, Humanitarian Law Project can be thought of
as the Roberts Court's Grutter. In Grutter v. Bollinger," the Court
purported to apply strict scrutiny to the University of Michigan
Law School's race-conscious admissions program." But as the dis-
senters in that case pointed out, the majority's analysis largely
deferred to the school's judgments on the issues relevant to strict
scrutiny analysis and discussed narrow tailoring only mini-
mally.7
Justice Breyer's dissent in Humanitarian Law Project echoes
this aspect of the dissents in Grutter. In Humanitarian Law
Project, Justice Breyer took on the unusual (for him) position of
adhering to rigid legal categories, without the interest-balancing
70. Id. at 2727.
71. Id. at 2724.
72. Cf Pierre J. Schlag, Rules and Standards, 33 UCLA L. Rev. 379, 397 (1985) (dis-
tinguishing between rules and standards, and describing as a "rule-like position" the view
"that once speech is found to be protected, it remains protected regardless of the weighty
reasons the state might advance to justify suppression or regulation").
73. Humanitarian L. Project, 130 S. Ct. at 2722-2727.
74. Id. at 2729.
75. 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
76. See id. at 326-327 (stating that "[wlith these principles [of strict scrutiny] in mind,
we turn to the question whether the Law School's use of race is jusitifed by a compelling
state interest").
77. Id. at 347 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); id. at 350(Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); id. at 380 (Rehnquist, C.J., dis-
senting); id. at 387 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
832 [Vol. 40
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that marks so much of his approach to constitutional law." For
example, he considered whether the plaintiffs' proposed speech
fell within one of the accepted categories of unprotected speech,
and found it did not." Then, finding the statute to be a content-
based restriction on speech, he questioned why the Court simply
did not announce the proper standard to be applied-strict scru-
tiny."o He also determined that the statute's application to the
plaintiffs' proposed speech was not narrowly tailored." Finally, in
performing a narrow-tailoring analysis, he refused to defer to
what he described as overly general factual findings by Con-
gress.8 2 These characteristics of his dissent put Justice Breyer in
the position of the dissenting Justices in Grutter, who protested
what they saw as the majority's abandonment of the elements of
the doctrine they were purporting to apply." Like them, Justice
Breyer in Humanitarian Law Project insisted that the Court
apply the rules implied by the Court's own description of the gov-
ernment action-here, as a content-based restriction on speech.
Whether the analogy is perfect is beside the point. The fun-
damental insight is that in Humanitarian Law Project, the
doctrinal principles trumpeted by the Court in cases such as Citi-
zens United and Stevens gave way to the Court's perception of the
practical realities of the situation, which justified the effective
abandonment of the standards it announced as applying to the
case.
II. CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS, JUSTICE STEVENS, AND
THE LIMITS OF FIRST AMENDMENT RIGIDITY
In considering the appropriateness of rigid First Amendment
standards, it is useful to think about Justice Stevens' role in these
78. But see Humanitarian L. Project, 130 S. Ct at 2734 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (assum-
ing, for purposes of argument, that the statute is content-neutral, and concluding that the
Court should nevertheless "measure the validity of the means adopted by Congress against
both the goal it has sought to achieve and the specific prohibitions of the First Amend-
ment").
79. Id. at 2732-2733.
80. Id. at 2734.
81. Id. at 2734-2735.
82. Id. at 2735-2741.
83. See e.g. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 387 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (stating that the Court
"does not apply strict scrutiny. By trying to say otherwise, it undermines both the test and
its own controlling precedents.").
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three cases. In Citizens United, he wrote the dissent, relying
heavily on his context-rich view of the First Amendment.8 4 In
Humanitarian Law Project, he deserted his liberal colleagues and
joined Chief Justice Roberts' opinion, which departed in reality
(and arguably in form as well)" from the rigidity of the content-
neutrality rule. In both cases, then, he embraced the sort of con-
text-rich approach that has marked his First Amendment
analysis more generally.16
His approach has its limits. Judging cases based on general
principles invites different applications of those principles, espe-
cially when-as here-they cabin judicial discretion only at a high
level of generality. Justice Stevens' approach to equal protection
issues illustrates this problem: his insistence that judges deciding
equal protection challenges apply a single rationality standard"
opens the door for enormously variable results that feature a
heavy element of judicial subjectivity." His principles-based First
Amendment approach risks similar variability-in particular, his
emphasis on factual context surely tempts judges to reach the
results they like based on the facts in front of them."
On the other hand, Chief Justice Roberts' claim in Humani-
tarian Law Project to be applying demanding scrutinyo is also
problematic. It is not particularly honest. Just as important, the
deference he gives in that case belies the entire point of such
standards: to constrain the Court's temptations when faced with
84. 130 S. Ct. at 929 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
85. For a review of Chief Justice Roberts' opinion, consult supra notes 66-74 and
accompanying text.
86. See Stevens, supra n. 18, at 1304-1305 (espousing a context-based approach to
First Amendment analysis); see also Araiza, supra n. 16, at - (discussing Justice Ste-
vens' approach to First Amendment cases).
87. See e.g. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 451-453 (1985)(Burger, C.J., & Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment) (discussing the basic context-
based analysis every equal protection case undergoes).
88. See Araiza, supra n. 16 , at (ms. at 27) (discussing this risk in Justice Stevens'
equal protection jurisprudence).
89. See e.g. Blocher, supra n. 8, at _ (ms. at 6) (noting that the cost of allowing devia-
tions from rigid rules is the risk of creating "a 'lawless' and unpredictable system in which
individual judges have all the power and can rule according to their own political prefe-
rences or prejudices"); see also David E. Pozen, Justice Stevens and the Obligations of
Judgment, 44 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. - (forthcoming 2011) (ms. at 108, available at http:/
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=1740572) (explaining how Justice Stevens
crafted "tools of self-restraint" to avoid engaging in the "idiosyncratic and instrumental
behavior" that otherwise potentially flowed from his interpretive method).
90. 130 S. Ct. at 2724.
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unpopular speech or speech that the government has a keen polit-
ical interest in attempting to suppress." If the difficult fact
pattern in Humanitarian Law Project leads the Court to recite
the formula of strict scrutiny (or, in the Court's words, "a more
demanding standard" than intermediate scrutiny)9 2 but then to
apply it in a deferential way, then little is left of the promise that
"keep[ing] the starch in the standards" will help courts resist
speech restrictions in "those moments when the daily politics
cries loudest for limiting what may be said."" In other words, it is
fair to wonder whether such seemingly stringent standards do
any better at constraining judicial discretion than Justice Ste-
vens' approach.
The contrast between rigid rules and more context-based
analysis is illuminated by a fascinating sotto voce dialogue
between Justice Stevens' dissent in Citizens United and Chief
Justice Roberts' majority opinion in Humanitarian Law Project.
In Citizens United, Justice Stevens mocked the majority's categor-
ical rejection of identity-based First Amendment restrictions by
asking whether, under the majority's approach, Tokyo Rose would
have had a First Amendment right to engage in pro-Japanese
speech during World War II. 4 In Humanitarian Law Project,
Chief Justice Roberts similarly satirized the dissent's argument
that advocacy of peaceful dispute resolution should generally be
allowed, concluding that the dissent would presumably have pro-
tected assistance to Imperial Japan in the methods of peaceful
conflict resolution during World War II. Both uses of the Japan
analogy make the point that rigid, acontextual standards simply
do not work in all cases. If such a standard does not work in the
hard cases," then presumably it fails in its core mission." Factual
context matters.
91. See e.g. id. at 2726-2727 (noting the foreign relations complications that might
arise from a ruling protecting the speech at issue).
92. Id. at 2724.
93. Denver Area Educ. Telecomm. Consortium, Inc., 518 U.S. at 774 (Souter, J., con-
curring).
94. 130 S. Ct. at 947 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
95. 130 S. Ct. at 2730.
96. This is not to suggest that the Japan examples present hard cases-although pre-
sumably in some contexts analogous cases today might. The larger point is that a standard
that does not work in all cases will presumably find especially difficult sledding in the
hardest cases.
97. See Denver Area Educ. Telecomm. Consortium, Inc., 518 U.S. at 774 (Souter, J.,
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In sum, both rigid and more contextual approaches to First
Amendment analysis have flaws. As an empirical matter, it may
be that rigid-but-not-categorical rules are largely unable to cabinjudges' inclination to give the government the benefit of the doubt
when the speech restriction at issue is either popular or reflects
serious, legitimate concerns. For example, Justice Douglas
expressed concern with the "clear and present danger" test on the
ground, among others, that courts were often too quick to find
such a danger to exist." Similarly, Justice Kennedy justified his
call for a categorical rule prohibiting content-based restrictions of
First Amendment-protected speech based in part on the fear that
non-categorical standards-even rigid ones such as strict scru-
tiny-invite the government (and perhaps courts) to experiment
with watering down free-speech protection." This failure may
mean that such standards provide the false certainty of a tough-
sounding rule that fails when it is most needed. At the same time,
it allows judges to hide behind that standard when striking down
concurring) (finding that "fairly strict categorical rules" really "keep[] the starch in the
standards for those moments when the daily politics cries loudest for limiting what may be
said").
98. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 450, 454 (1969) (Douglas, J., concurring).
I see no place in the regime of the First Amendment for any 'clear and present dan-
ger' test, whether strict and tight as some would make it, or free-wheeling....
When one reads the opinions closely and sees when and how the 'clear and
present danger' test has been applied, great misgivings are aroused. First, the
threats were often loud but always puny and made serious only by judges so wedded
to the status quo that critical analysis made them nervous.
Id. at 454.
99. See Simon & Schuster, Inc., 502 U.S. at 124, 127 (Kennedy, J., concurring in thejudgment) ("When we leave open the possibility that various sorts of content regulations
are appropriate, we discount the value of our precedents and invite experiments that in
fact present clear violations of the First Amendment, as is true in the case before us.").
Ironically, Justice Kennedy himself is not immune from such experimenting-an observa-
tion that perhaps lends credence to his own warning. For example, in City of Los Angeles v.
Alameda Books, Inc., he argued that the city's secondary effects justifications for limiting
adult businesses are content based; nevertheless, he approved of the intermediate scrutiny
the Court has applied to such restrictions. 535 U.S. 425 (2002) (Kennedy, J., concurring in
the judgment).
But further experimenting of a more serious sort might flow from the application of
his proposed categorical rule. In particular, if labeling a restriction as content based neces-
sarily requires its invalidation, it is possible that courts will strain to avoid attaching that
label. Compare e.g. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 649, 651 (1994) (holding
that federal rules requiring cable operators to carry the signal of over-the-air broadcasters
were content neutral and thus approving of intermediate scrutiny review of those rules)
with e.g. id. at 676-678 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (arguing
that the restrictions are content based).
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speech restrictions that may be justified by their unique factual or
social context.'o
Ultimately, the main benefit of rigid standards may lie in the
fact that in the mine run of difficult but not excruciatingly diffi-
cult cases, they provide enough of a thumb on the judicial scale to
produce predictable results that do a reasonably good job of pro-
tecting the constitutional value at issue. Thus, such rigid
standards, like Newtonian physics, do a good enough job of pro-
viding satisfactory answers in most cases, failing only in the
exceptionally difficult ones. This is a somewhat disappointing
result, given Justice Souter's hope that they could accomplish
more.'o More importantly, it is an open question whether this
limited benefit outweighs the possible harms such rigid standards
cause, both in terms of judicial transparency and the limits they
place on government speech regulation that non-dogmatic (but
still careful) analysis would uphold.
Regardless of these uncertainties, several facts remain clear.
First, we are in the early years of Chief Justice Roberts' tenure on
the Court. Second, Justice Kennedy is likely to remain on the
Court for at least several more years. Third, the remainders of
these two Justices' tenures are likely to be marked by serious con-
cerns over national security. When combined, these facts mean
that we are likely to witness further tests of rigid First Amend-
ment rules against serious government interests in restricting
speech. How those rules perform will tell us much about their
value.
100. See Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 929 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissent-
ing in part) (arguing that the special features of corporate and union political speech
justify restrictions).
101. See Denver Area Educ. Telecomm. Consortium, Inc., 518 U.S. at 774 (Souter, J.,
concurring) (finding that "fairly strict categorical rules" really "keepl I the starch in the
standards for those moments when the daily politics cries loudest for limiting what may be
said").
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